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Abstract 
 
In the recent years, the emergence of the Software-
as-a-Service (SaaS) business model has attracted great 
attentions from both researchers and practitioners. Under 
the SaaS business model, vendors deliver on-demand 
information processing services to user firms, and thus 
offering computing utility rather than the standalone 
software itself.  The SaaS has become an attractive 
alternative to the traditional software delivery model, 
which typically requires users to purchase, install, and 
maintain software systems by themselves. In this work, we 
propose an analytical model to study the competition 
between the SaaS and the traditional COTS (Commercial 
off-the-shelf) solution for software applications. The 
competitive model considers heterogeneous users who 
differ in terms of their transaction volume, while the SaaS 
and COTS vendors differ in terms of their pricing 
structure, setup cost, and system customization. We 
conclude that when commercial software becomes more 
open, modulated, and standardized, the SaaS business 
model will take a significant market share. In the extreme 
case, it may dominate the whole software industry and 
drives the traditional software out of the market. We also 
show that it is never optimal for the SaaS vendors to exert 
their full lock-in power through harsh software contracts. 
Under certain conditions, we suggest SaaS vendors to 
offer their existing users an easy exit option rather than 
to establish switching barriers to lock them in. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the past few years, the Internet has given rise to 
the Software-As-A-Service (SaaS) business model. The 
SaaS vendors offer a bundle of software applications, an 
IT infrastructure, and all necessary support services to 
users across a network. Under the SaaS business model, 
the software system and users’ data are stored off-site in a 
central location run by the vendor. The vendor is in 
charge of all IT support services, including daily software 
maintenance, data backups, software upgrades, and 
security. Therefore, it is delivering computing utility, 
rather than the software only.  
In a recent memo, Bill Gates proclaimed that the 
emergence and rise of the SaaS will be the “next sea-
change” in computing [14]. According to AMR Research, 
the SaaS market is growing more than 20% a year, 
compared with single-digit growth in traditional software 
[13]. An increasing number of software vendors, 
including industry giants such as IBM, SAP, Oracle, and 
Microsoft, are moving to such a service-oriented business 
model. For example, IBM is offering “IBM-on-demand,” 
which allows corporate users to acquire IBM’s computing 
power and software applications as a service.1 IBM is also 
providing a package of services and incentives to help 
other software companies deploy their products as hosted 
applications [15]. Another good example is Oracle. 
Oracle is ranked as one of the top ten SaaS providers. In 
January 2006, it acquired Seibel, and now is delivering its 
fledgling CRM on-demand software through the Internet 
[16].  
To many corporate users, SaaS has become an 
attractive alternative to the traditional software solution. 
Traditionally, most software has been delivered in the 
form of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products.2 The 
vendor sells the software application to users and helps to 
install it on users’ sites. The users possess the full 
ownership of the software, and must provide IT 
infrastructure, hardware, and support services in order to 
enable continuous use of the software. However, the SaaS 
deliver the software in a novel way. Under the SaaS 
model, unlike the software perpetual licensing, the 
software is priced as a service, and typically users pay a 
fee per transaction. Users’ payments are closely tied to 
the actual utility obtained -- they pay only when they have 
demand for the software. In many cases, the SaaS may 
prove cheaper than owning and maintaining an in-house 
IT system. Users expect to save money on support and 
upgrade costs, IT infrastructure, IT personnel, and 
implementation [13]. In a web survey by ThinkStrategies 
fully one-third of 118 respondents were already using 
                                                 
1 See http://www-1.ibm.com/services/ondemand/success.html. 
2 A COTS product is a commercial software application that “is designed 
to be easily installed and to interoperate with existing system 
components.” Almost all software bought by the average computer user 
fits into the COTS category: operating systems, office product suites, 
word processing, and e-mail programs are among the myriad examples.  
 See http://whatis.techtarget.com for more information.    
SaaS, and another third were considering using one 
within the following 12 months [7]. A research report 
from Summit Strategies indicates that small and medium 
businesses with limited IT resources and constrained 
budgets are more likely to use such fee-per-transaction 
applications [5]. The SaaS is a powerful trend, which is 
becoming an important disruptive force in the software 
industry: “It is not the end of software. It is just another 
way of deploying it” (Shai Agassi, president of SAP’s 
product and technology group).  
Despite of numerous advantages, the SaaS market is 
still in its formative stage. Data security and reliability as 
well as application control are among users’ top concerns 
[1]. In addition, most SaaS vendors offer a one-to-many 
solution, with limited customization.3 The vendors keep 
the software in their own sites, and users access and run 
the software remotely. The software therefore is not 
tailored to fit an individual user’s specific requirements or 
unique business environment. As a result, the user may 
need to pay extra to make the standard software 
application work smoothly with its existing IT systems. 
Software pricing / contracting is another issue. In reality, 
many vendors demand users’ long-term commitments 
through contracts. For example, a typical contract offered 
by the SaaS vendor in the radiology industry requires 
client hospitals to use the product for at least five years. 
An early exit incurs cancellation fees that can be as high 
as a full year’s payments. Hence, the potential of being 
locked in by an outside provider becomes a barrier for 
users to use the SaaS. All these factors cast doubts on the 
future of the SaaS business model. So far, little research 
work has been done in analyzing the long run viability of 
the SaaS from the economic perspective. Specifically, it is 
unclear how such a new business model can compete with 
the well-established software solution (i.e., the COTS in-
house system), what factors play important roles in 
software users’ choices, and what is the optimal 
contracting strategy for the SaaS vendors. This motives 
our work.  
In this study, we propose a model to study the 
competition between a SaaS and COTS software. We 
focus on a software market in which corporate users have 
these two IT options for external sourcing. The competing 
vendors are differentiated in the following ways. First, 
they deliver different products: an easy-to-be-customized 
software application (from the COTS) versus a bundle of 
standard software and services (from the SaaS). Second, 
they adopt distinct pricing modes: an outright purchase 
(the COTS) versus a “per transaction” fee structure (the 
SaaS). Third, they employ different delivery methods: 
software installed on a user’s in-house server (the COTS) 
                                                 
3 SAP believes that this lack of integration will eventually lead most 
large corporations that currently are users of online CRM move back to 
an in-house system [6]. 
versus an interface delivered over the Internet remotely 
(the SaaS). Users have different cost structures and bear 
different risks in dealing with each business arrangement. 
In addition, our model considers software quality 
uncertainty and investigates the two-stage competition 
with users’ switching costs. Although, in practice, the 
comparison between the SaaS and COTS involves 
multiple criteria, such as pricing structure, data 
integration ability, service level arrangements, as well as 
technological and security issues, we do not attempt to 
include all the related factors. Instead, we are particularly 
interested in estimating the relative economic advantages 
and disadvantages of the SaaS business model.  
Our findings show that the emergence of the SaaS, at 
the expense of the traditional COTS vendor, benefits 
every user firm. It offers small and medium firms cost-
saving access to software, and competitively reduces 
large firms’ implementation costs even if they will still 
stick to the traditional COTS software. In specific, the 
SaaS model is superior to the COTS model when the user 
firms face a low transaction volume, expensive in-house 
IT services, or when the user’s unfit costs from using a 
standard product are low. Importantly, we show that the 
long-run viability of the SaaS business model largely 
depends on the magnitude of the unfit costs imposed on 
the users. As such costs decrease, the SaaS’s competitive 
advantage monotonically increases, and eventually will 
dominate the whole software market. In addition, we find 
a non-monotonic relation between the users’ switching 
costs and the SaaS vendor’s profit. In a matured software 
market, when users’ switching costs decrease below a 
certain level, the market share of the SaaS vendor 
increases and its profit improves. In other words, the SaaS 
vendor may find it profitable to allow users to exit the 
contract easily. This finding challenges many existing 
SaaS software contracting strategies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we describe our model. We analyze the 
competition and identify the key determinants of the 
future of the SaaS model in Section 3. Section 4 discusses 
the business implications of our findings, and concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider the software market with three parties: 
software users --- firms in need of software applications; 
the COTS vendor --- the software provider delivering the 
traditional COTS software; and the SaaS vendor --- the 
software provider delivering software as a service. The 
two software vendors are competing on prices. They set 
their respective prices, and then the users will choose one 
of them or just stay out of the market. 
Software users have different IT needs. Users’ IT 
needs are measured by the expected volume of their use 
of the software. Some firms may use the software 
application more frequently than others, and these firms 
have larger IT needs. In order to capture this 
heterogeneity, we assume users are uniformly distributed 
on a unit-length line normalized from 0 to 1. The location 
of a user on this line represents its transaction volume. 
Hence, a user at the location id  has a demand id  for the 
software use (in terms of the number of transactions).  
The COTS vendor operates in the traditional way. It 
sells the packaged software application to users and 
charges a one time upfront fee. The source code of the 
application can be modified to fit the user’s specific 
business needs, which assures a good integration with the 
user’s existing IT system. The vendor bears an operating 
cost C  to serve one user and receives a one-time 
payment P from the user. The user must install hardware 
and IT infrastructures, hire IT staff, and organize an 
internal IT group to provide software maintenance, data 
backups, and security and capacity management. The 
service costs associated with each use of the software is 
denoted by c (i.e., the service costs per transaction). Each 
transaction creates a value of u to the user. 
The SaaS vendor sells the bundle of software and 
services, rather than the software only. In reality, most 
SaaS vendors have established large data centers and 
strong network infrastructures. To start doing business 
with a user, the vendor first moves the user’s data to its 
own server, which costs the vendor a one-time setup cost 
S. The vendor provides all necessary IT services to enable 
the software use, which imposes a service cost c per 
transaction on the vendor. Users “pay as they go”. Hence, 
they bear no initial setup costs, but need to pay a price 
ap  per transaction. The software application is installed 
on the vendor’s site and all users can access and run it 
remotely via the Internet. Thus, the SaaS vendor is using 
the “one to many” business structure since one software is 
serving many users. To any individual user, the 
application is not well-customized, and each transaction 
gives the user a total value of u-t. The parameter t 
measures the user’s disutility from not using its ideal 
product. In many cases, it also represents the cost of extra 
effort to make the outside application work with the 
user’s existing IT components smoothly. In the rest of the 
paper, we call t a user’s “unfit costs.” We assume that the 
exact value of the unfit costs is unknown by the user ex 
ante, the reason being that software applications are 
experience goods. Before a user firm uses the software 
application, it does not know in advance how the 
application fits its specific business environment or how 
much effort it must exert in order to run this new 
application with its existing applications smoothly. Such 
information will be fully revealed only after the user runs 
the application in the real settings. We assume that the 
unfit costs can be low ( Ltt = ) or high ( Htt = ), each 
equal probability. 
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the COTS and SaaS 
solutions respectively. The black dot in the figures 
indicates the location of the software system.  
 
 
Under the SaaS business model, software users are 
outsourcing their IT services to the vendor. They form a 
close partnership instead of the simple buyer-seller 
relationship, which makes users highly dependent on the 
outside provider. If a user wants to stop using the SaaS 
software, it bears the costs of getting the data back and 
recovering the data, which constitute non-negligible 
exiting costs. In addition, many SaaS vendors will require 
users to pay a high cancellation fee to stop the business 
relation. We denote the total exiting costs by the 
parameter E.  
Users need make two-stage decisions. In the first 
stage, they face incomplete information, i.e., they do not 
know the exact value of unfit costs t. Users choose the 
SaaS or COTS software by comparing their expected 
payoffs. After that, the SaaS users learn their exact unfit 
costs. With this new information, some of them may exit 
the market or switch to the COTS, at a cost of E. The 
decision timeline is shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 2. The SaaS business model 
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3. The Analysis 
 
We first formally formulate users’ decisions as well 
as vendors’ pricing competition in section 3.1. We then 
study and compare two scenarios – the software market 
with low switching costs and with high switching cost in 
section 3.2. Finally, section 3.3 uses numerical examples 
to demonstrate how the SaaS vendor’s profit varies as 
switching costs gradually increase. To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that both software providers and user 
firms care long-run profit (utility) only. In other words, 
the learning stage [ ]T,0  is short and considered a 
“transient” stage.  
 
3.1. Formulate the general problems 
 
The COTS-SaaS competition game takes three steps.  
Step 1. The COTS and SaaS vendors determine their 
optimal prices, P and ap  respectively.  
Step 2. Given the prices, users, without knowing 
their exact unfit costs, decide which software to take. It 
happens at Time 0, as in Figure 3.  
Step 3. Given their initial choices, users, now 
obtaining the exact unfit costs, decide whether to exit the 
SaaS contract (given that they have chosen SaaS 
initially). It happens at Time T, as in Figure 3.  
We need solve the problem backward, step by step.  
We first analyze the Step 3. At time T, the market 
outcome must be the following: there is a user with 
transaction volume 1d  such that all users with transaction 
volume smaller than 1d  have chosen the SaaS software 
while those larger than 1d  have chosen the COTS. 
Hence, users, who have transaction volume [ ]1,0 ddi ∈  
and turn out to have high unfit costs Htt = , need take one 
of the following actions: keep using SaaS, switch to the 
COTS, or exit the market. The corresponding payoffs 
from each action are iHa dtpu )( −− , EPdcu i −−− )(  
and E−  respectively.  
We define “the marginal SaaS user” with transaction 
volume SaaSd . This marginal user is the “last switcher,” 
given that it has chosen the SaaS initially. Hence, all high 
unfit costs type users ( Htt = ) with transaction volume 
smaller than SaaSd  will choose to stay with the SaaS, 
while larger than SaaSd  will exit the SaaS. The value of 
SaaSd  is given by { }EEPdcuMaxdtpu SaaSSaaSHa −−−−=−− ,)()( .  (1) 
Similarly, we define the “the marginal COTS user” 
with transaction volume COTSd : { }EdtpuMaxEPdcu COTSHaCOTS −−−=−−− ,)()( . (2) 
After users’ switching, the final equilibrium market 
outcome is depicted in Figure 4. We need analyze two 
cases: the market is fully served (case a), and the market 
is partially served (case b). In case a, all users who exit 
the SaaS choose to switch to the COTS; i.e., 
ctp
EPdd
Ha
COTSSaaS −+
+== . In case b, users in 
[ ]COTSSaaS dd ,  choose to exit the SaaS and stay out of 
the market, i.e., 
cu
Pd
utp
EPd COTS
Ha
SaaS −=<−+
+= .  
 
Now we move to the Step 2 to find the expression for 
1d . At Time 0, the user with transaction volume 1d  is 
indifferent between the two options, given that its unfit 
costs are unknown yet. So, we have 
PdcudtpuEPdcu La −−=−−+−−− 111 )()(2
1])[(
2
1 .  (3) 
The left-hand side of the equation is this user’s 
expected utility from choosing the SaaS at Time 0.  With 
half probability, the user will be with high unfit costs and 
switch to the COTS later; and with half probability, the 
user will be with high unfit costs and keep using the 
Figure 4. Equilibrium market segmentations 
0 1 1
dCOTSdSaaSd
Users with tL 
use the SaaS; 
Users with tH  
choose the SaaS 
initially and  
exit the market 
later. 
All 
users 
choose 
the 
SaaS 
Users’ transaction volume 
Users with tL 
use the SaaS; 
Users with tH  
choose the SaaS 
initially and  
switch to the 
COTS later. 
All users 
choose the 
COTS 
0 T Time Line 
Two decision points for users.  
Time 0: Users do not know their unfit costs. They choose to use 
the COTS or SaaS product. 
Time T: Users get the full information of the value of unfit costs. 
Some may decide to exit the SaaS due to high unfit level.  
Stage1: learning period. 
SaaS users learn their 
exact unfit costs.  
Stage 2 
Figure 3. The two-stage decisions 
SaaS. The right-hand side is this user’s utility from 
choosing the COTS at Time 0. Solving it gives out 
ctp
EPd
La −+
−=1 . 
Finally, we analyze the Step 1. Knowing all the 
consumers’ behaviors discussed above, the two software 
vendors choose their optimal prices simultaneously to 
maximize their profits.  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−=∏ )(
2
11)( 11 COTSCOTS
P
dddCPMax . 
  
( ) 1
0
1
2
1 SdxdxxdxcpMax
d
d
d
aSaaSp
SaaS
SaaS
a
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−=∏ ∫∫ .  
The COTS vendor serves all users in ]1,[ 1d  and 
users with high unfit costs in ],[ 1ddCOTS . The SaaS 
vendor serves all users in ],0[ SaaSd  and users with high 
unfit costs in ],[ 1ddSaaS , but it bears the initial setup 
costs for all users in ],0[ 1d . Note that the COTS payment 
is per user, since it is an upfront one time payment for 
each user, while the SaaS payment is per transaction.   
 
3.2 Software market with absolute lock-in power 
versus partial lock-in power  
 
It seems mathematically too complicated to solve the 
general optimal prices analytically. To get useful insights, 
in this subsection, we study and compare two special 
scenarios:  
(1) Users face significantly high switching costs. No 
user, once it chooses the SaaS, is able to exit due to the 
high switching costs. The SaaS vendor has absolute lock-
in power. We believe that this type of market is close to 
the reality given that we do observe many SaaS users are 
highly dependent on their outside provider and are 
typically facing high penalty fee if they want to stop the 
software use.  
(2) Users face small switching costs. There are 
always some users who choose the SaaS initially and 
switch in the later stage. The SaaS vendor has partial 
lock-in power. We are interested in examining whether, 
and if so, when a loose bond between the users and the 
SaaS vendor will benefit the vendor. It will provide useful 
managerial implications to the SaaS vendor in their 
contracting strategy. 
The following propositions state our main findings in 
these two types of markets.  
Proposition 1. In the market where users face high 
switching costs, as users’ unfit costs from using a not 
fully customized system decrease, the relative 
economic advantage of the SaaS business model 
increases monotonically.    
Due to the space limit, we are not providing the 
details of the proof, which is available upon requests. The 
above proposition shows an interesting finding. To some 
extent, our model resembles the duopoly competition 
model with vertically differentiated products, with the 
SaaS as the low-quality provider and the COTS as the 
high-quality provider. The unfit cost t measures the 
quality difference between their products. In the 
traditional vertical differentiation model, when the quality 
difference decreases, the low-quality provider initially 
gets better off because its product becomes more 
attractive, but it gets worse off as the quality difference 
decreases further because the competition becomes more 
intensive and eventually hurts both vendors. However, in 
the setting we study, we find that reducing the value of t 
benefits the low-quality provider (i.e., the SaaS vendor) 
monotonically. Moreover, when the two vendors’ 
products are close enough, the high-quality provider (i.e., 
the COTS vendor) could be squeezed out of the market. 
We believe that our findings deviate from traditional 
vertical differentiation literature because the two vendors 
here are using different business models.   
This result is very important. It reveals the future 
evolution of the software market. As Figure 5 shows, as 
unfit costs t decreases, the software market will transit in 
a way of “the COTS dominates Æ the COTS and SaaS 
coexist Æ the SaaS dominates.” Figure 5 depicts three 
critical values of unfit costs, 1t <
*t < 2t , which define 
four different regime. In each regime the market presents 
distinct structures.  
Regime 1. ],0[ 1tt∈ : All users opt for the SaaS model. 
The COTS solution fails out of the market.   
Regime 2. ],[ *1 ttt ∈ : Both the SaaS and COTS models 
coexist in the software market. The competition benefits 
each software user (i.e., total consumer surplus increases).  
Regime 3. ],[ 2
* ttt ∈ : Both the SaaS and COTS models 
coexist in the software market, but not directly compete 
with each other. They serve different market segments. 
Regime 4. cut −> : The SaaS business model is not able to 
survive. The COTS model is the only software solution. 
Hence, we conclude that users’ unfit cost, which 
represents users’ disutility from using an non-ideal, not 
fully-customized software, is the most important 
determinant of the success of the SaaS business model.  
Besides, our analyses also find that when it becomes more 
expensive to provide on-site IT support services (a large 
value of c), user firms will find the SaaS solution of 
outsourcing the IT services to outside experts more 
Figure 5. The market structure transition with t 
*t  1t  2t  unfit cost  
1 2 3 4 
attractive. In such a situation, we can prove that the SaaS 
model is expected to take a significant market share.  
Another important finding of us is that under certain 
conditions, it is optimal for the SaaS vendor to give up its 
full lock-in power, which is stated below. 
Proposition 2. When the software market is fully 
covered, namely, when no users are priced out of the 
market, the profit of the SaaS vendor is higher in the 
scenario that users can exit the SaaS contract in a less 
costly way than in the scenario where exiting costs are 
very high.  
The proof is omitted and available upon requests. 
This result tells us that it is never optimal for the SaaS 
vendor to assert absolute lock-in power in a competitive 
marketplace. The reason is: high exiting costs reduce the 
attractiveness of the SaaS business model. Knowing that 
it is easy to become dependent on the outside provider, 
potential users become more conservative when deciding 
whether to partner with the SaaS vendor in the first stage.  
This conclusion, however, is valid only when the 
market is fully covered (case a). In other words, it is true 
only when all user firms have access to the software 
system. We can think of the “matured” software 
application markets, such as server operating systems 
(e.g. Linux, Windows NT) and basic software systems 
(e.g., Microsoft office, email), in which almost all firms 
are able to afford such applications. We then suggest that 
the SaaS vendors in such areas should not demand users 
long term commitments. In contrast, allowing users to 
free exit will increase the profitability of the SaaS model. 
 Below, we give an example to show that when some 
users stay out of the market in equilibrium (case b), a 
SaaS vendor may gain higher profits by relying on its 
strong lock-in ability.  
Consider a market with 
3
cutL
−= , cutH −= , and 
6
MOTSCS ≤ . When the SaaS vendor is able to lock in all 
existing users, it will charge 
3
2* cupa
+=  and keeps all 
users in ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+ )(22
1,0
cu
C . However, when users are able 
to switch at low costs, in order to keep users, the vendor 
has to reduce its price to a very low level, close to c. This 
low price, although giving full market coverage, is likely 
to make the vendor unprofitable. If so, the vendor would 
rather give up a part of the users — let them exit in the 
second stage. For simplicity, we solve the price and profit 
of the SaaS vendor at the extreme case of 0=E . It is easy 
to show that the optimal price *0 a
E
a pp <= . On the other 
hand, all users with high unfit costs will exit the SaaS in 
the second stage. As a result, the vendor only serves those 
users with low unfit costs and low transaction volume ( 
[ ]01,0 =∈ Ei dd ). We can further prove that the number of 
users of the SaaS also reduces. Consequently, the 
vendor’s profit is lower.  
In this example, a SaaS vendor with full lock-in 
power is able to charge a higher price and still possess a 
larger market share. In contrast, this vendor will have to 
set a lower price but still loses market share when users 
are able to switch costless. Hence, in such scenario, we do 
suggest the SaaS vendor should only offer long-term 
contracts which require high penalty costs for early exits 
to lock in users. 
 
3.3. A numerical example  
 
So far, we have focused on the comparison of two 
special types of markets: the SaaS provider has absolute 
or small lock-in powers. It is more interesting if we can 
draw a whole picture to see how the SaaS vendor’s profit 
changes as its lock-in power increases. It will help us to 
identify the optimal exiting costs (in terms of maximizing 
the SaaS vendor’s profit). To show this, we rely on 
numerical examples.  
Consider the market with following parameters. 
15=u , 2=C , 3=c , 5=Ht , 3=Lt , 0=S . Note that in 
this case, the whole market will be covered, and so the 
conclusion from Proposition 2 should stand.  
Figure 6 reveals a non-monotonic relation between 
the SaaS vendor’s profit and the users’ exiting cost. As 
exiting costs increase, the vendor’s optimal profit 
increases first, peaks at 6.0=E , and decreases after that 
at a fast speed.  
Such a similar non-monotonic curve remains after we 
try different parameter values. This suggests that exerting 
absolute lock-in power on users is never the ASP’s 
optimal strategy (as consistent with our Proposition 2); 
instead, the optimal switching costs for the vendor are 
likely to be at a middle level.  
     Figure 6. The SaaS’ profit versus exiting costs 
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4. Business implications 
 
Delivering software as a service, a novel business 
model, has profound impacts on the software vendors, 
users and the whole industry. Such a SaaS model has 
three most important features: First, the vendor offers 
utility rather than the software. Users therefore are 
relieved of heavy IT service burdens, which are 
outsourced to the outside provider. Second, the vendor 
adopts the usage-based fee structure. It does not require 
high upfront payments. Users therefore can pay as they 
go and smooth their payments over a period. Third, the 
vendor installs and manages the software and users’ data 
on its own site. Users therefore become very dependent 
on the vendor and face potential lock-in risks. In this 
work, we identify and model all these important factors, 
and analyze the competitive advantage / disadvantage of 
the SaaS business model.  
We show that when the users’ unfit costs parameter 
reduces, the SaaS business model will intensively 
compete and even gradually replace the COTS traditional 
software. It will result in the transition of the whole 
software industry to the service-oriented structure. The 
key question then becomes: how to reduce users’ unfit 
costs in practice? Most user firms have existing IT 
systems in house, such as the legacy systems. When a 
new software application is needed, but it is not 
customized to fit the user’s existing IT components, the 
user has to incur some extra efforts to make them run 
smoothly together. For example, a hospital that is using a 
new, un-customized PACS (Picture Archiving and 
Communications System) has to run an additional 
software module to convert the output/ input between the 
hospital’s in-house research information system and the 
new PACS application. Such efforts represent users’ extra 
unfit costs, which may be reduced in multiple ways. On 
the vendor’s side, they should create applications that are 
most compatible with other systems and programs, by 
writing the applications using an open language (for 
example, XML), in a proper modular structure, and with a 
loosely coupled interface with other applications. All 
these strategies would help to increase the application’s 
ability of being compatible with other systems. In 
addition, industry-wide adoption of software standards 
and protocols, once achieved, will also make the 
communications and cooperation across different 
applications easier and thus would reduce the unfit costs. 
In reality, some efforts have been made in this direction. 
In January 2006, Salesforce.com developed and launched 
AppExchange, an online marketplace for on-demand 
business software. It allows Salesforce.com and other 
software providers to establish across-application 
integration and therefore provides users seamless 
extension of their existing systems [2] [12]. Users expect 
to have reduced unfit costs because a uniform platform 
eases collaboration across software applications.  
Our findings suggest that the SaaS vendors can also 
enhance their competitive advantage through the 
appropriate contracting strategy. The nature of the SaaS 
business arrangement endows the vendor significant lock-
in power so that the vendor is able to exploit its existing 
users to reach high profitability. However, unlike some of 
the classical results on ‘lock in’ pricing [4] [8] [9] [10] 
[11], we reach an interesting, and somewhat 
counterintuitive result: under certain market conditions, 
when the users’ exiting costs decrease below a certain 
level, the SaaS vendor’s market share increases and its 
profit improves. In other words, the vendor may find it 
optimal to help users switch out at low cost to them, and 
therefore it should strategically reduce users’ exiting 
barriers instead of increasing them. In specific, we show 
that it is never optimal for the SaaS vendor to exert full 
lock in power in the competitive marketplace. The fear of 
being locked in by an outside provider will drive users 
away from the SaaS. This challenges many of the existing 
contracts in the SaaS market. To negotiate an exit strategy 
has been an important part of the software contracts [3]. 
Users are looking for a smooth and quick exit in order to 
avoid being locked in by one outside provider, but many 
vendors deliberately increase users’ switching barriers in 
order to obtain lock-in advantages. We suggest that under 
reasonable market conditions, the interest conflict 
between the SaaS vendor and its users in fact does not 
exist. The vendor should cooperate and help their users to 
have easy exits. Hence, we would suggest the contract 
designed in the way that the vendor does not charge users 
high cancellation fees, assures users that they can get their 
data back intact once they decide to exit the contract, and 
cooperates and guarantees the data transition done in days 
or hours. The increased attractiveness of a contract that 
requires no lengthy commitment and ensures easy exits 
allows SaaS vendors to draw users who otherwise might 
opt for the traditional COTS software, and finally 
increases the SaaS profitability.  
To conclude, the future prosperity of the SaaS 
business model requires both technological and 
managerial efforts. As the technologies further improve to 
bring a new set of software applications, and as the 
software vendors improve their understanding of the 
market and therefore take economically optimal 
contracting strategies, we expect to see more software 
will be delivered as a service.   
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